 |
Enrichment Plant in Resende: joint inspection by ABACC and IAEA
In its issue of April 4, 2004, The Washington Post journal
published an article stating that the Brazilian government
was refusing to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) to perform inspections at the uranium enrichment plant
under construction in Resende, Rio de Janeiro State, Brazil.
Additionally, the article raised suspicion concerning a new
nuclear race and the danger of its potential evolution into
a nuclear weapons program. As it was to be expected, such information
was soon tackled by the main communication media in Brazil
and Argentina and this led to the need for numberless clarifications
by the officials in both countries and by the Brazilian-Argentine
Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).
This is not the first time —and will not be the last
one— in which important journals, such as The Washington
Post , spread sensationalist news leading to false conclusions
that, either intentionally or not, may constitute an attempt
to hinder nuclear development in both countries. Consequently,
we would rather use this spot to enlighten the international
safeguards community regarding the essential issues in this
controversy.
The plant under construction in Resende is a commercial facility
for the enrichment of uranium, at low levels, using ultracentrifugation.
On the basis of information disclosed by Indústrias
Nucleares do Brasil (INB), the operation of the first
sector of the plant, representing only a small fraction of
its total capacity, is scheduled to start in late 2004. With
regard to this first stage, the ABACC has negotiated and agreed
with the Brazilian authorities which will be the inspection
and verification procedures, based on perimeter control. This
procedure will allow the Agency to comply with the obligations
established in the Common System for Accounting and Control
of Nuclear Materials (SCCC), concerning Argentina and Brazil,
as established in the Bilateral Agreement between both countries.
At the same time, the IAEA is currently negotiating, with both
the ABACC and the Brazilian authorities, the method to be applied
for the verification of the plant, after its full erection,
under the constraints of the Quatripartite Agreement. This
means that the current situation does only involve a difference
on how to approach the same issue. The IAEA is willing to analyze
the safeguards approach for the plant as a whole, while the
ABACC —along with the Brazilian authorities— is
negotiating the application of safeguards for the first stage
of the facility. The ABACC understands that, at this stage
in the construction of the enrichment plant, maintaining the
panels for the protection of the technological secrets, as
proposed by the operator, does not mean hindering an effective
application of nuclear safeguards. The application of safeguards
actions including visual and unrestricted access to the cascade
hall, as postulated by the IAEA, is an issue for further discussion,
as the expansion of the plant starts to take place.
This type of negotiations is the usual one during the construction
of any plant with features such as those of the Resende Plant.
It is important to note that the IAEA has already announced the
type of ad hoc inspections they are planning to perform,
which are based on a periodical verification of the changes in
the inventory of nuclear materials and on the collection of samples
at strategic spots, until an agreement is reached with the ABACC
and Brazil concerning the safeguards approach, within the framework
of the Quatripartite Agreement.
Elías
Palacios
José Mauro
Esteves dos Santos
Secretaries
|
|
ABACC, axis of the nuclear
bilateral dynamic
The Argentine embassador, Renato Sersale di Serisano analyzes ABACC, mentioning
the agency as an exemple of the importance given by Brazil and Argentine to the
consolidation of peace and safety internationally, as well as of the engagement
upon the non proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
see more
The Additional Protocol:
Logic and Impact
This article describes the gradual steps that led to the Additional Protocol
and analyzes the logic which backs the new
safeguards measures it introduced.
The impact of
these new measures is discussed as they are compared to the traditional
safeguards approach which presently is applied to the nuclear material in all
the nuclear facilities.
see more
by ››› Marco
Marzo
The Verification of Spent Fuel Elements in Atucha I. A Well Succeeded
Experience
bem sucedida.
Starting at the time of the construcion of the reactor of Atucha I, the article
gives an account of the development of the safeguards criteria employed to carry
out verifications at this reactor, as well as of the measures that were taken
in order to adapt its facilities to this evolution.
see
more
by ››› Orpet
Peixoto
ABACC
Laboratories Quality Assurance Though Secondary Standars Exchange
Program
see
more Considerations on Safeguards Approach for Small Centrifuge
Enrichment Facilities
see more
Development
of Low-Level Environmental Sampling Capabilities For Uranium at Brazilian and
Argentine Laboratories by Abacc
see
more
Esarda
nda working group - Results of the Monte Carlo "simple
case" benchmark
exercise
see
more
Ten
Years of Technical Cooperation Between the DOE and ABACC
see more
Performance Values For Non Destructive Assay (Nda) - Techniques
Applied to Safeguards: The 2002 Evaluation by the Esarda NDA
Working Group
see more
 
|
|
