ABACC, the core of bilateral nuclear dynamics

Renato Carlos
Sersale di Cerisano

Member of the Commission of the
ABACC Director of International
Security, Nuclear and Space Affairs
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
International Trade and Worship of
the Argentine Republic

Frequent meetings with foreign colleagues in different international forums related to non-proliferation and disarmament keep reminding me of the actual dimension of the ABACC and of its permanent global prestige. Sooner or later, the promoted disillusions implicit in the numerous nuclear crises and the idle behavior of nuclear powers in facing their commitments concerning disarmament will lead the international community to rescue the ABACC —almost therapeutically— as a global achievement.

When faced with the appearance of new clandestine nuclear programs and of a “commercial” network of nuclear technology connected with such programs, the US Secretary of State Colin Powel himself had to mention the cases of Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Kazakstan and Ukraine in order to offset criticism.

Without getting involved in a thorough analysis on who deserves the honors, it is worth recalling that, through the application of diplomacy and multilateralism, sustainable results have been reached in the non-proliferation arena. Highlighting only the failures appears to be, at least, somewhat selfish.

Back to the ABACC, it is evident that both Argentinians and Brazilians expected a lot more than just ingratiate themselves with a world that had ended up by accepting the NPT’s discrimination as the least harmful among the possible choices. The Agency was the symbol of a change in the perception of a new remedy that allowed to take the path of regional integration. Tangentially, it was beneficial for international peace and security but, essentially, the two countries involved were the ones that did well.

Submitting our nuclear activities to safeguards resulted in better relationships with third parties and between ourselves. I am convinced of the fact that non-proliferation tools are only successful when they are applied in States that are fully convinced of the advantages of their application. Entering international legal commitments that imply resigning to mass destruction weapons must be, fundamentally, the product of an internal process.

Necessarily, in the case of regional rivalries, this process must be developed symmetrically in the involved countries. Due to its importance as from the geographical, economical, political and security viewpoints, the La Plata river basin was the scenario of competition between the Spanish and the Portuguese Empires for centuries. Such competition continued between the succeeding countries, Argentina and Brazil. Even though this ompetition has only meant rising up in arms in a single occasion (1827), there have been several periods of tension and armed vigil. The question is: how did this subregion evolve towards cooperation and integration?

Celso Lafer has pointed out that the proximity and immediateness of the actors around the La Plata river basin has led to a context in which the political and economic events in each country, or the relationships among some of them, produced a direct impact upon the rest, both in their local environments and in that of their international relations. There is a complex interdependence that has an influence upon both conflict and cooperation.

As the issues related to the best use of the rivers in the River Plate Basin were solved, conditions arose for integration and long-lasting cooperation. The strengthening of democratic values and the rationalization of an evident communion of interests made the rest.

In other regional scenarios, such as the Mideast, the Korean Penninsula, India and Pakistan, nuclear proliferation is a central problem. Statements have been made indicating that, consequently, ideas should be focused to regional solutions for these problems and to preventing new cases of proliferation. However, as it has been mentioned repeatedly, extrapolating the success in our region to other scenarios is still premature.

Argentina is a nuclear country and is willing to maintain this active stance in its energy policy. This reality, in addition to the international competitiveness of some local products, has obliged Argentina to apply an open policy in agreement with the safeguards system that, in our case, is constituted by the Quatripartite Agreement. Within this context, the ABACC is part of Argentina’s priorities in foreign policy because its existence has enhanced our predictability and reliability, and we have assumed that these values are essential in an attempt to play a leading role in the world scenario of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Nevertheless, the nuclear cooperation that we have generated with our neighbor Brazilians should go far beyond mutual “verification”. First, in so far as cooperation is concerned, evidently, in spite of their difficulties, both countries have both a significant scientific-technological base and a respectable capacity for managing nuclear facilities, while peaks of excellence can be found in certain specific activities. This is a fertile land for progressing into joint projects.

Additionally, the sudden changes in trends experienced by nuclear power worldwide have also been reflected in our countries. Now, opportunities and challenges arise that generate a new scenario for the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear convergence.

On the basis of trust and transparency between ourselves and towards the rest of the world, we are in the proper condition to attain greater integration between our nuclear sectors, thus strengthening our capacity for negotiation with regard to innovations that are currently under analysis in the international arena.

In spite of the above, the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Nuclear Energy Applications (ABAEN) is still pure fiction and has been posed as a challenge that seems to be exceeding the capabilities of our nuclear sectors.

In the field of international safeguards, after the approval of the Additional Protocol to the safeguards agreements in 1997, important progress has been made in the application of the new actions contained in the Protocol and in their integration with the “traditional” safeguards activities. I feel that the result of the process currently underway must be a strengthened and more efficient safeguards system to be aplied non-discriminatorily in all the countries with similar safeguards obligations. On the basis of the greater security to be gained through the application of the Additional Protocol, integration should result in an actual reduction of efforts in traditional verification, in greater efficiency and in cost neutralization.