THE VII REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE TREATY
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SÉRGIO DUARTE Ambassador, President of the VII Review Conference.

The VII Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was held in New York, from 2 to 27 May 2005. Its 188 Parties meet every five years, as stipulated in the Treaty, to review the performance of the instrument and take decisions related to it.

The 2005 Review Conference began amid widespread international concern about nuclear proliferation and disarmament. Important challenges to the regime were obvious: not only three States still kept away from the NPT (Israel, India and Pakistan), but the last two had declared to possess of nuclear weapons¹. Moreover, the Democratic and Popular Republic of Korea had announced its withdrawal from the treaty² and its intention to manufacture such weapons, while Iran had been accused of developing a clandestine nuclear military program. Lybia had just acknowledged a similar effort, which had not been detected by the existing verification mechanisms. By the same token, the countries recognized by the NPT as nuclear weapon States (NWS) – the United States,Russia, United Kingdom, France and China – were perceived as not willing to take concrete measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, as stipulated in the Treaty itself (Aticle VI). Some of these States openly contested decisions to that effect taken by the previous Review Conference, in 200. On top of all that, the possibility of extremist groups acquiring nuclear explosive devices injected a new and sinister dimension to the problems of proliferation and international terrorism.

During the three years previous to the 2005 Conference, the Parties to the NPT sought unsuccessfully to raech agreement on the necessary conceptual basis and procedural decisions. At the last of the three Sessions of the Preparatory Committee, it was impossible even to approve an agenda that could be recommended to the Conference. One of the few procedural decisions of the III PrepCom was the nomination of Brazil, in my person, to the Presidency of the Review Conference. At my insistence, the III Prepcom (April 2004) entrrusted me with undertaking consultations in preparation for the Review Conference, on questions of substance as well as of procedure. In the period intervening between these two Conferences I tried to discharge that responsibility, for which the Brazilian Ministry of External Affairs provided the necessary logistic support.

At the opening of the Review Conference, on May 2 2005, there was still no agreement on the main item of the agenda: what should be the focus of the Conference. The United States did not want any direct mention to the results of the 2000 Review Conference (which had agreed on practical measures of nuclear disarmament, known as the “13 Steps”) and proposed instead that the 2000 Conference dealt with “recent events”, that is, the accusations against Iran. The latter could not accept such a proposal and counted on the support of many members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Other NWS and some of their allies argued that the Conference should be concerned only with non-proliferation. Egypt, supported by the Arab countries and several members of the NAM, seemed intent on blocking any procedural decision. Egyptian motivations looked complex and in part extraneous to the objectives of the Conference. Intransigence from all sides made agreement extremely difficult, since the consensus rule, strictly observed, in practice confers on each Party to the Treaty the power to veto any decision.

Such was the state of affairs as the general debate started, while I conducted intense consultations on the side to try to find agreement on the agenda and the program of work, necessary steps for the consideration of substantive questions. Almost two weeks were spent in long formal and informal meetings, until a consensual formula, agreable to all Parties, was found. A few more days were needed to define the program of work. When at last the three Main Commitees were able to start their work on substance, there was not enough time available for any practical result. Given the climate of mistrust and even animosity among the Parties, besides to the wide gulf separating the main positions on the substantive questions, consensus would in any way be extremely improbable, if not impossible. During the last few days of the Conference I still tried to put together a short text that might unite the Parties on some expression of support for the Treaty and its objectives, but the level of intransigence was too strong. There was nothing left to the Conference but face its own failure. In its substantive part, the Final Document simply records the lack of agreement.

Secretary General Kofi Annan characterized the Review Conference as a “missed opportunity”. Indeed, some consider that the 2005 Review Conference failed completely. Others chose to believe that its frustrating result is after all within normal bounds, since the 1975, 1985 and 1990 Conferences ended in a similar manner. They consider that if there was no progress for the backers of certain positions, neither those who supported opposing views gained any ground. Still others point to what they consider were useful substantive discussions on questions such as withdrawal from the Treaty and its relation to Article X. Nevertheless, the evaluation of overwhelming majority is that the credibility of the regime instituted by the NPT is threatened and that it is urgent to search for new constructive solutions, both to prevent a new wave of proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote nuclear disarmament.

From the substantive standpoint, the main divergence centered, on the one hand, on the insistence of the NAM, with some backing from the European Union, on the need for simultaneous progress on non-proliferation as well as on nuclear disarmament; on the other, the five nuclear-weapon States considered, although with nuances and different approaches, that non-proliferation should be prioritized. The United States seemed to argue for nothing but a condemnation of Iran’s program and rejected any follow-up to the results of the 2000 Review Conference, particularly regarding the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The European Union favored a non-confrontational approach to the Iranian question, through the strengthening of the system of safeguards operated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and seemed to advocate the primacy of non-proliferation measures over disarmament, at least in the present state of international affairs. The Non-Aligned Movement, a large and heterogeneous group, kept its unity around positions of principle whose rigidity left little margin for consensus. Its cohesion was displayed especially by the difficulty to steer away from solidarity with Egypt and Iran, and by the reluctance to shift towards preventing a procedural deadlock. It was finally possible to overcome an impasse on procedure thanks to the action of some of its more influential members, which unfortunately was not enough to promote consensus on the substantive questions.

More than delving deeper into the analysis of the reasons for the lack of results of the Review Conference, it is especially important to ponder its consequences on the future of the non-proliferation regime and on the prospects for progress on nuclear disarmament. There is an obvious disenchantment from many Parties to the NPT at the performance of the instruments that the international community has been able to put together in the past few decades. The visible erosion of the NPT must be seen together with other factors such as the resistance of the United States to the CTBT (which is the major obstacle the entering into force of that Treaty); the continued refusal of the NWS to extend effective security guarantees to the non-nuclear nations; the adherence, by the NWS and their allies, to military doctrines predicated on the possibility of use of atomic weapons; their efforts to improve existing nuclear arsenals; the emergence of developing countries willing to utilize dual-use technologies for avowed peaceful purposes; the relative inefficacy of the verification systems of the IAEA, as became clear in the case of Iran; and the contemporary phenomenon of terrorist extremism. In the background of the divergence on the treatment of these questions lies, of course, the inherently discriminatory character of the NPT itself, which imposes on its non-nuclear Parties the faithful observance of binding undertakings, while the obligations of the nuclear-weapon Parties are expressed in vague terms and are not subject to time-frames or to any form of verification of monitoring.

In the first few years of the 1960’s, when the idea of elaborating a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons gained strength at the United Nations, a General Assembly resolution (A/RES/2028, of 19 November 1965), set forth the basic lines that should guide the negotiation of a future such instrument. Among others, there should be “an acceptable balance between the mutual responsibilities and obligations of nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States”. During the second half of the same decade, despite the deep mistrust and rivalry ingrained in their relationship, the two superpowers of the day, the United States and the Soviet Union, negotiated between themselves the text of a treaty, with some assistance from certain members of the Western military alliance. The text was then presented to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in Geneva. Notwithstanding the misgivings of several non-nuclear States, including Brazil, the two superpowers forwarded the text to the General Assembly of the United Nations, which in 1968 endorsed and recommended it to the accession of all States. Gradually, the majority of the international community came to sign and ratify the NPT; the Brazilian Congress did it in 1998, stating formally its understanding that concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament would be forthcoming.

The late Ambassador João Augusto de Araújo Castro pointed out at the start of the 1970’s a situation which he named “the freezing of world power”, the main instruments of which were, in his view, the United Nations Charter, with the bestowing of veto power to the five permanent members of the Security Council, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which recognized those same States as legitimate possessors of nuclear-weapons, to the exclusion of all others. Those five States seem to interpret that recognition as guaranteeing the permanent possession of their nuclear arsenals. During the decades of the Cold War, this situation remained stable; however, after the demise of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the unchallengeable military might of only one nation and the gradual marginalization of the United Nations for the treatment of international crises, divergences on the structure of international relations began to surface.

The central Powers, wary of multilateral organizations and felt alarmed at the sinister realities post 9/11, placed trust on ad hoc mechanisms to control nuclear proliferation over the existing multilateral instruments; for their part, the rest of the international community felt concerned with the growing threat of interference and intervention and argue for a wider participation in international decisions and reject attempts to restrict their sovereignty. That is the case, for instance, of the proposals to control the nuclear fuel cycle, put forth respectively by President George Bush and the Director-General of the IAEA, Mohammed El-Baradei. Both proposals are viewed with reservations by developing countries that mastered the technology to enrich uranium and seem willing to proceed with plans to utilize it fully for peaceful purposes, as the NPT entitles them to. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that only when developing countries started to master the uranium enrichment technology, and seemed ready to compete in the international market, this fact began to alarm those which for a long time had possessed that technology.

In this second half of the year 2005, some of the more active parties to the NPT seem intent on moving to try to limit the negative consequences of the lack of results of the 2005 Review Conference. Suggestions from several non-nuclear countries and serious NGO’s have started to circulate in international symposia and progressive think-tanks. At the same time, on the opposite extreme, there is a surge in the promotion of unilateral or plurilateral³ solutions, mainly from Western states, aiming at a tighter control of activities deemed to be prejudicial to nuclear security. It is perhaps still early to gauge the reach and the possibilities of success of all those ideas and preparations, which will need time to grow and mature within the dynamic and changing environment of international relations in our era. Nevertheless, what seems to take shape is an awareness of the importance of a new consensus to allow for the discussion of initiatives and proposals that affect the international community as a whole in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as in the wider context of collective security, so that decisions may be taken with the ample and non-discriminatory participation of all its members. Only thus will it be possible to stem the trend to negate the capacity of international instruments to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promote disarmament. Despite its imperfections and original sin, the NPT is still the main instrument at the disposal of the world community in this field. All its members have the responsibility to preserve the progress acquired during the 35 years of its existence, to watch over the strict obervance of all obligations contained in it and to work toward the final and complete realization of its objetives, and so reclaim the credibility and authority of the Treaty. The unacceptable alternative is the primacy of arbitrariness and force at the service of narrow, parochial interests aimed at perpetuating the imbalances which still afllict international relations.

¹ Israel adheres to the policy of neither confirming nor denying to possess atomic weapons.
² The VII Conference decided not to deal with the question of whether or not the DPRK was still a Party to the NPT, in order not to prejudice the ongoing Six Party Talks (China, Japan, United States, Republic of Korea, Russia and the DPRK).
³ That is, so-called "coalitions of the willing" espoused by a limited number of countries, instead of by the international community as a whole.