Nº 04  enero-septiembre/2005
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CLOSING THE SWU BALANCE ON A RANDOM BASIS

Marco Marzo, Hugo Vicens

Definition of the Problem

The safeguards’ objectives for enrichment facilities encompass the detection of the diversion of declared nuclear material and facility misuse. Diversion scenarios on declared nuclear material include inflating the MUF and or concealment of diverted material introducing gross, partial or bias defect into uranium or isotopic content in some items, complemented with data falsification.

Relevant scenarios of facility misuse include the production of high-enriched uranium (HEU) or low-enriched uranium with enrichment higher than 5%; and undeclared production of low enriched uranium with enrichment lower than 5%.

While the installed separative work capacity and the throughput are small, misuse scenarios are the dominant concern from the safeguards point of view, particularly those associated with feeding the plant with undeclared LEU.

One on the main misuse scenario at centrifuge enrichment facilities is the SWU deviation. The operator declares that has used X SWU/y, but effectively he used Y<X for production of declared enriched uranium and uses the difference X-Y to enrich undeclared uranium. That means the operator can divert SWUs. Swipe environmental sampling is presently the most powerful tool to confirm the absence of unrecorded production of direct use material. The verification of the SWU balance, associated with U and U-235 mass balance, is another relevant measure to detect SWU diversion. The traditional approach for enrichment facilities foresees the closing of the SWU balance once per year, at the end of the Material Balance Period, at the Physical Inventory Verification. This has two disadvantages: the uncertainty associated with the SWU closing is relatively high because it is performed only once per year and this scheme does not introduce any deterrence into the verification.

The introduction of enrichment and flow monitors on line in the headers would be a measure to confirm the SWUs that are really used in the enrichment process. Such monitors however are under development and not yet available for safeguards purposes. As an alternative measure to the enrichment and flow monitor, a scheme of closing periodically the SWU balance at randomly selected opportunities is proposed.

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consulte además

Information Protection When Applying Safeguards to Centrifuge Enrichment Facilities

Regional Arrangements: Nuclear-Weapon Free Zones and ABACC

The Argentine-Brazilian Joint Inspection Program (ABACC), Regional System

 

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